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Abstract 
We empirically examine the impact of the stand-alone risk committee on corporate risk-taking 
and firm value. We argue that the existence of a stand-alone risk committee enhances the 
quality of corporate governance which results in improved investor protection by reducing 
corporate risk-taking and enhancing firm value. We find several measures of risk-taking 
decline significantly for firms that have a stand-alone risk committee compared with firms that 
have a joint audit and risk committee. We also find that the presence of a stand-alone risk 
committee is positively associated with firm value. The evidence is consistent with the 
proposition that the firms with a stand-alone risk committee can effectively evaluate potential 
risks and implement a proper risk management system.  
Keywords: stand-alone risk committee; corporate risk-taking; firm value; Australia. 
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1. Introduction 
In the early years of the 21st century, the high number of business collapses and 
corporate scandals, such as Enron and Worldcom, cost investors billions of dollars due to 
declines in share prices. Confidence in the securities markets was shaken. Consequently, 
governments and financial regulatory authorities in several countries introduced policies and 
regulations to protect shareholders’ interests. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 
2002 adds criminal penalties for corporate misdeeds of management. In Australia, the 
Corporate Governance Council (CGC) of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) has set 
guidelines for organisations and boards of directors to evaluate potential risks and implement 
proper risk management systems for their companies. Furthermore, the CGC of the ASX 
suggests forming a risk committee, with the majority of members being independent directors 
(ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2014). 
The empirical evidence on the impact of investor protection on corporate risk-taking is 
mixed. For example, John, Litov and Yeung (2008) find a positive relationship between 
corporate risk-taking and investor protection, by defining investor protection based on the rule 
of law in a country, anti-director rights, and rating of accounting disclosure standards across 
different countries. In contrast, Bargeron, Lehn and Zutter (2010) find a relative decline in 
several measures of risk-taking in US firms compared with non-US firms, after the 
implementation of the SOX Act. However, the major limitation in these studies is that they 
compare the impact of investor protection on corporate risk-taking among the firms of different 
countries. For example, Bargeron et al. (2010) compare US firms with non-US firms; therefore, 
the relative decline in corporate risk-taking might be related to factors unique to US firms 
instead of the SOX Act. Similarly, the positive correlation between corporate risk-taking and 
investor protection in John et al. (2008), might also be a result of economic and other factors 
unique to those countries in the sample rather than the difference in investor protection. 
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Therefore, the primary aim of this study is to empirically examine the association 
between the corporate risk-taking and the existence of a stand-alone risk committee. We argue 
that existence of a stand-alone risk committee enhances the quality of corporate governance 
which results in improved investor protection. Furthermore, we examine the impact of a stand-
alone risk committee on firm value. We use the risk committee data of Australian firms to 
define the firms that have a stand-alone risk committee and those that have a joint audit and 
risk committee. To define corporate risk-taking, we use the level of investment in research and 
development, market return volatility, and the variability of accounting performance. As the 
primary purpose of setting up a stand-alone risk committee is to oversee the risk management 
framework of the firm and make recommendations on managing the risk of investment in 
projects, we therefore posit that firms with a stand-alone risk committee not only manage their 
risk properly but also avoid engaging in unnecessary risk prone activities which could result in 
a relative decline in their risk-taking measures. Furthermore, we expect that firms with a stand-
alone risk committee have higher firm value since the existence of a stand-alone risk committee 
is presumed to lower the firm’s overall risk of failure. 
We advocate the existence of a stand-alone risk committee over a joint audit and risk 
committee for several reasons. Primarily, an audit committee is responsible for overseeing the 
financial reporting quality and issues relevant to financial reporting risk. However, some firms 
are engaged in a diversified range of risks, such as credit risk, foreign currency risk, strategic 
decision failure risk and risks relating to investments; these are just some among many risks 
which remain beyond the responsibility of the audit committee. Zaman (2001) casts doubt on 
the effectiveness of an audit committee on the risk management process and suggests that the 
skills required for risk management activities are distinct from the responsibilities of the audit 
committee. Finally, we understand that the approach to risk management varies between a 
stand-alone risk committee and a joint audit and risk committee. While the emphasis on risk 
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assessment for a joint audit and risk committee is backward looking, a stand-alone risk 
committee considers a forward-looking approach. 
Using the corporate governance data of Australian firms listed in the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) in the years 2001 to 2013, we find that all three measures of risk-taking, i.e., 
the level of investment in research and development, market return volatility, and the variability 
of accounting performance, decline significantly for the firms that have a stand-alone risk 
committee compared with the firms that have a joint audit and risk committee. Our findings 
also suggest that firms with a stand-alone risk committee have higher firm values relative to 
the firms with a joint audit and risk committee. Finally, we use a propensity score matching 
technique and several other robustness tests and show that our main findings remain robust for 
the big size firms, firms with a higher number of independent directors on the risk committee, 
and for other firm-specific and corporate governance-related variables. 
 Our study contributes to the existing corporate governance literature by presenting new 
evidence that firms that are subject to the same economic conditions and regulations differ in 
their corporate risk-taking depending on the type of committee they use to manage risk. 
Therefore, in the absence of clear guidance on the regulation role of risk committees, our 
findings encourage firms to set up a stand-alone risk committee to not only reduce corporate 
risk-taking but also enhance firm value. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature and develops the relevant hypotheses, and Section 3 describes the sample and 
methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and the last section concludes. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis development 
Risk-taking is an essential part of the business and the growth of a firm depends on 
operating at the right level of risk. The shareholders of a firm are justifiably concerned with 
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whether management is taking risks based on shareholders’ interests or based on their private 
interests (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989). To alleviate the concerns of shareholders, governments and 
organizations introduce policies and rules to protect shareholders’ interests and discourage 
management from taking unnecessary risks. In the US, for example, the SOX Act discourages 
directors from approving risky projects. Furthermore, the Act requires top management to 
certify their company’s financial statements, and it imposes criminal liability for corporate 
misdeeds. In Australia, the ASX Corporate Governance Council recommends that an 
organization should evaluate potential risks before the inception of investment decisions and 
proposes that a risk committee is put in place (either as a stand-alone risk committee or part of 
the audit committee), comprised in the majority of independent directors (Principle 7 of ASX 
Corporate Governance Council, 2014).  
Traditionally, it is the audit committee’s role to measure and manage the overall risk 
profile of the company (e.g. Brown, Steen and Foreman, 2009). However, the audit committee 
might not have the required skills to effectively oversee firm risk, especially non-financial risk, 
i.e., operational, strategic, regulatory, and other risks (Daly and Bocchino, 2006; Zaman, 2001). 
Authorities in several countries have therefore suggested that companies have a stand-alone 
risk committee to manage the overall risk profile, with members having expertise in risk 
management activities (Financial Stability Board, 2013). 
Despite numerous efforts to discourage firms from taking unnecessary risks, there is 
still debate whether policies and rules to protect investors would increase or decrease corporate 
risk-taking. One strand of literature suggests that managers avoid taking risky projects to 
protect their careers and personal benefits in firms and countries where investor protection is 
weak (e.g. Amihud and Lev, 1981; Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992; Holmstrom and Costa, 1986). 
It follows that better investor protection and efficient monitoring mitigate the conservative risk-
taking approach of managers (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002). In contrast, some studies argue 
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that dominant shareholders have the authority to monitor managerial behaviour in low 
protected investor environments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002); 
therefore, managers might not have the authority to avoid taking risky projects. However, in 
the presence of better investor protection, managers have less fear of expropriation and 
consequently, might have greater discretion to reduce risk. 
Two recent studies (Bargeron et al., 2010; John et al., 2008) empirically examine the 
relationship between investor protection and corporate risk-taking. John et al. (2008) find 
support for the positive relationship between investor protection and corporate risk-taking by 
defining investor protection based on the rule of law in a country, anti-director rights, and rating 
of accounting disclosure standards across different countries. In contrast, Bargeron et al. (2010) 
find a significant decline in different measures of risk-taking in US firms compared to non-US 
firms after considering the impact of the SOX Act on US firms. They define investor protection 
based on the difference in capital expenditures, research and development expenses, the 
standard deviation of returns, etc. Therefore, the risk-taking measures in both studies are 
different from each other and not directly comparable. Furthermore, the findings of these 
studies might be a result of the difference in economic conditions and other factors because 
they do not examine and compare the relationship between investor protection and corporate 
risk-taking among the firms of the same country. Bargeron et al. (2010) mention in their paper 
that they cannot rule out the possibility that factors unique to the US firms might be related to 
their relative decline in risk-taking, when compared to the non-US firms, instead of the SOX 
Act. Thus, it would be useful to examine the corporate risk-taking of firms from the same 
country, Australia1, and compare those that have a stand-alone risk committee with those that 
have a joint audit and risk committee.  
                                                          
1 We do not include the firms that do not provide information whether they have a risk committee or joint audit 
and risk committee in our main analysis because it is possible that those firms do not provide details about their 
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There are only a few studies that examine the impact of stand-alone risk committee on 
corporate governance using data from Australia or Malaysia. Yatim (2010) finds that 
Malaysian firms with a higher number of independent directors on the board are likely to set 
up an independent or stand-alone risk committee to show their commitment to minimizing 
ﬁnancial, operational and reputational risks. Subramaniam, McManus and Zhang (2009) 
identify that stand-alone risk committees tend to exist in Australian companies with larger 
boards and an independent board chairperson, and in companies with higher financial reporting 
risk and lower organisational complexity. However, the major limitation of the Subramaniam 
et al. (2009) study is that only 22 of their 200 sample companies have a stand-alone risk 
committee which raises the concern of generalizability of findings. Furthermore, the Yatim 
(2010) and Subramaniam et al. (2009) studies only examine ﬁrm characteristics and board 
factors associated with the establishment of the stand-alone risk committee. In a recent paper, 
Ng, Chong and Ismail (2012) examine the relationship between risk management committee 
and the underwriting risk of insurance companies in Malaysia and find that risk-taking is 
negatively associated with risk committee size and board independence. However, there are 
some limitations to their study. First, the risk management committee is compulsory for all the 
insurance firms in their sample. Second, they use underwriting risk that is limited to only 
underwriting companies. Third, the total number of observations in their sample is only 329. 
In summary, there is not one study that tests the impact of stand-alone risk committees on the 
corporate risk-taking of non-insurance firms. 
Overall, the literature offers both positive and negative relationships between investor 
protection and corporate risk-taking. However, prior studies are limited in that they do not 
compare the relationship between investor protection and corporate risk-taking among firms 
                                                          
committees. However, we compare the firms with stand-alone risk committees with the firms without stand-alone 
committees in the robustness tests, and our results remain robust. 
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facing the same economic conditions and regulations i.e. firms from one country. Therefore, 
using only Australian data, we fill the gap in the literature by comparing the risk-taking of firms 
having a stand-alone risk committee with that of firms having a joint audit and risk committee. 
The purpose of the stand-alone risk committee is to effectively manage the overall risk profile 
of the company which enhances the quality of corporate governance; therefore, we expect 
relatively higher investor protection in firms with a stand-alone risk committee compared to 
firms with a joint audit and risk committee. Furthermore, we expect a decline in risk-taking 
measures for firms with a stand-alone risk committee, as those firms are required to disclose 
additional risk-relevant information. Based on the above discussion we develop the following 
hypothesis:  
H1: Risk-taking propensity is lower for firms with a stand-alone risk committee. 
We then examine the impact of risk committee on firm performance, as the existence of 
a stand-alone risk committee is presumed to lower the firm’s overall risk of failure and, thus, 
increase firm performance. In fact, a large body of accounting and finance literature suggests 
that an improvement in risk management activities improves firm performance, especially 
among firms with a history of good corporate governance (e.g. Aebi, Sabato and Schmid, 2012; 
Gordon, Loeb and Tseng, 2009). Furthermore, the firms with an efficient risk management 
system are likely to avoid unnecessary risks, i.e. the risk for which the firm does not expect to 
receive compensation (e.g., Nocco and Stulz, 2006). 
Therefore, we suggest that having a stand-alone risk committee increases the value of a 
firm, as it is regarded as an indicator of good corporate governance and efficient risk 
management of the firm’s risk-related activities. Thus, our second hypothesis is: 
H2: Firm performance improves in the presence of a stand-alone risk committee. 
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3. Research Design 
3.1 Sample Selection 
We collect risk committee data of Australian firms from the Securities Industry 
Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) and monthly returns and financial accounting data 
from DataStream International. We limit our sample period from 2001 to 2013 because SIRCA 
does not provide risk committee data prior to 2001. Our sample from SIRCA provides us with 
13,488 firm-year observations on risk committee. We match risk committee firm-year 
observations with financial accounting data which results in 7,530 firm-year observations 
where each of the matched firm-years has either risk committee or financial accounting data. 
Following the literature (Lobo, 2017), we exclude financial institutions and remove 811 firm-
year observations from our sample. We then delete 4,818 firm-year observations which have 
no operational risk committees (neither a separate stand-alone risk committee nor a joint audit 
and risk committees), from either the SIRCA or DataStream data, which leaves a final sample 
of 1,901 firm-year observations. The final sample includes a combination of stand-alone risk 
committee (N=241) and joint audit and risk committees (N=1700). Finally, we winsorize all 
the continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the impact of outliers. 
---------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
3.2 Empirical Model 
We estimate the following model to test the risk-taking of the firms when a stand-alone 
risk committee is operational (hypothesis 1).  
 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝜕0 + 𝜕1𝑅𝐶 + 𝜕2𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝜕3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉 + 𝜕4𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝜕5𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 + 𝜕6𝛥𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆 +
𝜕7𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝜕8𝑃𝑀 + 𝜕9𝐼𝑀𝑅 + ∑𝜕𝑖𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + ∑𝜕𝑗𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + ɛ … … … … … (1) 
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RISK is a proxy for corporate risk-taking measure for each firm. We use three different 
measures of corporate risk-taking: the level of research and development (R&D/TA) as an 
investment risk measure, the standard deviation of returns σ(MRET) as a market-based 
measure, and the standard deviation of return on assets σ(ROA) as an accounting measure. We 
estimate R&D as the research and development expenditure scaled by total assets. Bhagat and 
Welch (1995) suggest that the benefits of R&D investment are uncertain and have a lower 
probability of success which reflects risk-taking propensity on long-term investment. 
Following the literature (Gomez‐Mejia, Campbell, Martin, Hoskisson, Makri and Sirmon, 
2014), we set R&D equal to zero for missing values. We measure σ(MRET) as the annual 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns in a year. The σ(MRET) is a conventional measure 
of corporate equity risk. A high value of σ(MRET) denotes more dispersion and, thus, high 
levels of risk (Bargeron et al., 2010). Finally, we compute σ(ROA) as the standard deviation of 
the income before tax and extraordinary items, scaled by total assets, over the prior three years. 
The σ(ROA) is widely used as an indicator of risk-taking measure (Habib and Hasan, 2017; Li, 
Griffin, Yue and Zhao, 2013; Nakano and Nguyen, 2012; Wright, Kroll, Krug and Pettus, 
2007), and it captures the overall risk taken by the firm. We use risk measures in one-year-
ahead values to capture the impact of an operational stand-alone risk committee.  
Our main variable of interest on the right side of equation (1), RC (𝜕1) is equal to 1 if a 
stand-alone risk committee is operational, otherwise 0. We expect the coefficient 𝜕1 to be 
negative since we hypothesize that stand-alone risk committee reduces the corporate risk-
taking. We also include the firm-specific variables on the right side of equation (1) that are 
suggested in the literature to have an impact on corporate risk-taking. Firm size (LOGSIZE) is 
a natural logarithm of total assets. The large firms are less likely to engage in high-risk 
investments and have more risk tolerance even if a risky investment initiates. We expect a 
negative association between LOGSIZE and RISK measures (Bargeron et al., 2010). Firms with 
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higher leverage (LEV) might constrain risk-taking propensity. Leverage (LEV) is defined as 
total debt to total assets as a proxy of financial resources. We expect a negative association 
between LEV and different RISK measures because firms with higher debt are more likely to 
be monitored by creditors, which results in lower risk (Li et al., 2013). Firms with high growth 
opportunities (MTBV), measured as the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity, 
are likely to choose riskier investments. We expect a positive association between MTBV and 
different measures of RISK (Laeven and Levine, 2009). Rogers (2002) shows that corporate 
risk-taking propensity is higher when capital expenditure (CAPEX) increases. We expect a 
positive association between CAPEX and RISK measures. We consider two proxies 
(SALESCHANGE and PM) to capture the variability and changes in sales. Sales growth is the 
change in sales compared to the previous year scaled by total assets. We expect a positive 
association between SALESCHANGE and different measures of RISK. A firm with higher sales 
change generates more cash flow and net income which leads to increased market return. Thus, 
investment is more rewarding when sales growth is higher (Anthony and Ramesh, 1992). Profit 
margin (PM) is the profitability of firm measured by the income before tax and extraordinary 
items, scaled by sales. Zahra (2005) posits that older firms tend to invest in new or uncertain 
projects to retain market leadership over the company’s life cycle. Therefore, due to their more 
stable financial position, firms that have been operating for a long time are more likely to 
choose risky investments compared with younger firms. Therefore, we expect a positive 
association between firm age (LOGAGE) and RISK measures. We calculate the Inverse Mills 
Ratio (IMR) following equation (3) which is explained in section 3.3. Our regression analysis 
considers any unobservable effect of operating year (YEAR) and industry (INDUSTRY). We 
cluster the standard errors at the firm (INDUSTRY) and time (YEAR) levels to control for cross-
sectional and time-series dependence, respectively (Petersen, 2009). 
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To test the impact of a stand-alone risk committee on firm value (hypothesis 2), we 
estimate the following regression model:  
𝐹𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛾2𝐵𝑂𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝛾3𝐵𝐼𝐺4 + 𝛾4𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛾5𝐿𝐸𝑉 +
𝛾6𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉 + 𝛾7𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑃 + 𝛾8𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸 + 𝛾9𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛾10𝑅𝐶 + ∑𝛾𝑖𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 +
∑𝛾𝑗𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + ɛ … … … … … (2) 
Our main variable of interest on the right side of equation (2) is RC (𝛾10). We expect 
the coefficient 𝛾10 to be positive because we hypothesize that stand-alone risk committee 
increases the value of the firm as it is regarded as an indicator of good corporate governance.  
Following the literature (e.g. McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Villalonga and Amit, 
2006), we use Tobin’s Q (TOBIN’SQ) as a proxy for firm value (FVAL). Tobin’s Q is measured 
as a ratio of the firm’s market value to total assets. Following Baxter, Bedard, Hoitash and 
Yezegel (2013), we use Return on Assets (ROA) as an additional proxy for firm value that 
captures the accounting performance, ROA, measured as the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets. Finally, we include a set of corporate governance 
variables (BODSIZE, BODIND and BIG4) on the right side of the equation (2) which are 
identified in the literature to enhance firm value (e.g. Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003). 
BODSIZE is the size of board directorship measured by the natural logarithm of total board 
size; BODIND is the representation of independent directors in the board measured as a ratio 
of total number of independent directors to total board size; BIG4 is audit quality, assigned as 
a value of 1 if the firm is audited by a big-4 auditor, otherwise 0. Similar to equation 1, we add 
a set of firm-specific variables (LOGSIZE, LOGAGE, LEV, MTBV, CAPEX and 
SALESCHANGE) on the right side of equation 2. We cluster the standard errors at the firm 
(INDUSTRY) and time (YEAR) levels to control for cross-sectional and time-series dependence, 
respectively (Petersen, 2009). 
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3.3 Self-selection of risk committee and corporate risk-taking 
The ordinary least squares regression estimates the determinants of corporate risk-
taking as a function of stand-alone risk committee and other control variables, where the choice 
of stand-alone risk committee is random. However, firms with specific characteristics are more 
likely to establish a stand-alone risk committee, i.e., big size firms, firms with independent 
directors, etc. Therefore, we apply the Heckman two-stage test to address the self-selection 
problem of the stand-alone risk committee, as the existence of a stand-alone committee might 
be a non-random choice. We estimate the following PROBIT model in the first stage of 
regression analysis: 
 
𝑃𝑟 (𝑅𝐶)𝑖𝑡 = µ0 + µ1𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + µ2𝐵𝑂𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷 + µ3𝐵𝐼𝐺4 + µ4𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + µ5𝐿𝐸𝑉 +
∑µ6𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + ∑µ7𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + ɛ … … … … … … … (3) 
 We expect a positive association between RC and a set of corporate governance 
variables (BODSIZE, BODIND, BIG4), as firms with large board size (BODSIZE), higher 
number of independent directors (BODIND) and large auditors (BIG4), are more likely to set 
up a stand-alone risk committee (e.g. Subramaniam et al., 2009; Yatim, 2010). Furthermore, 
we expect a positive association between RC and big size firms (LOGSIZE) because big size 
firms are capable of delegating separate responsibilities to the board of directors and are more 
likely to set up a stand-alone risk committee (Subramaniam et al., 2009). We also expect a 
positive association between RC and firms with higher leverage (LEV) because firms with 
higher leverage (LEV) are more likely to set up a stand-alone committee as higher leverage 
requires more internal monitoring (Hines and Peters, 2015). Finally, we control for any 
unobservable effect of operating year (YEAR) and industry (INDUSTRY) which might affect 
the existence of a stand-alone risk committee. We cluster the standard errors at the firm 
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(INDUSTRY) and time (YEAR) levels to control for cross-sectional and time-series dependence, 
respectively (Petersen, 2009). 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics and correlation analysis of our main variables. 
Panel A of Table 2 shows that almost 13% of the firm-year observations have a stand-alone 
risk committee and the average risk measures, R&D/TA, σ(MRET), and σ(ROA), are 0.016, 
0.172 and 0.137, respectively. The mean value of TOBIN’SQ and Return on Assets (ROA) is 
0.709 and 6.4%, respectively. Furthermore, the mean value of leverage (LEV) and capital 
expenditure (CAPEX) is 0.106 and 0.089, respectively. The average number of directors 
(BODSIZE) on the board is almost 6, of which 4 are independent directors (BODIND). Almost 
60% of the firm-year observations are audited by large auditors (BIG4).  
---------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
---------------------------- 
4.2 Mean difference test 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the firms with a stand-alone risk 
committee (RC=1) and those with a joint audit and risk committee (RC=0). It also provides the 
mean difference between the firms with a stand-alone risk committee and those with a joint 
audit and risk committee. There are 241 firm-year observations for stand-alone risk committee 
out of 1901 total observations. The firms with a stand-alone risk committee have relatively 
lower variability on all three risk measures (R&D/T, σ(MRET) σ(ROA)), compared with the 
firms with a joint audit and risk committee. Both the proxies of firm value (TOBIN’SQ and 
ROA) are higher in the presence of a stand-alone risk committee. Furthermore, the firms with 
a stand-alone risk committee are relatively older and more leveraged compared to the firms 
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with a joint audit and risk committee. These findings are not surprising as the corporate 
governance literature indicates that mature and visible firms tend to practice better corporate 
governance. Finally, the firms with a stand-alone risk committee have a relatively large board 
size and a higher number of independent directors on the board compared to the firms with a 
joint audit and risk committee. All the results are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
4.3 Correlation Analysis 
Panel C of Table 2 reports the results of bivariate correlation analysis. The firms with 
a stand-alone risk committee have a negative correlation with all the measures of corporate 
risk-taking which indicates that a stand-alone risk committee reduces the propensity of risk-
taking. Both the proxies of firm value (TOBIN’SQ and ROA) shows a positive correlation 
(r=0.19, 0.07; p<0.001) with the existence of a stand-alone risk committee (RC). All the 
measures of risk-taking (RISK) and firm value (TOBIN’SQ and ROA) show consistently 
positive correlations that are statistically significant at the 1% level. There is a positive 
correlation (r=0.24, p<0.001) between RC and board size (BODSIZE) which indicates that the 
firms with a stand-alone risk committee have a relatively large board size and a higher number 
of independent directors on the board (r=0.20, p<0.001). Furthermore, there is a positive 
correlation (r=0.07, p<0.05) between firms with a stand-alone risk committee and large 
auditors (BIG4) which indicate that firms with a stand-alone risk committee are being audited 
by the large auditors. Finally, there is a strong positive correlation (r=0.90) between board size 
(BODSIZE) and board independence (BODIND) which raise concerns of multicollinearity. We 
will discuss our approach addressing the multicollinearity concerns in section 4.4. 
4.4 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
Table 3 reports the regression results for equation (1), where we regress the measures 
of risk-taking (RISK) on several variables that might have an impact on corporate risk-taking. 
15 
 
Recall from section 3.2 that we employ three different risk-taking measures, (R&D/TA)t+1, 
σ(MRET)t+1 and σ(ROA)t+1, as a dependent variable to capture the impact of a stand-alone risk 
committee on corporate risk-taking. We also present the findings of equation (3) which was 
developed to control for self-selection biases of the existence of stand-alone risk committee. 
Column 2 shows the regression results for self-selection biases (equation 3). We estimate the 
Inverse-Mill Ratio (IMR) based on equation 3 and include it in equation (1) to eliminate any 
self-selection bias.  
---------------------------- 
Table 3 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
Columns 3–5 of Table 3 present the coefficients of risk-taking measures ((R&D/TA)t+1, 
σ(MRET)t+1 and σ(ROA)t+1), without including the control variables. We find that all measures 
of risk-taking decline significantly for the firms with a stand-alone risk committee compared 
to firms with a joint audit and risk committee. For example, the coefficients for (R&D/TA)t+1, 
σ(MRET)t+1 and σ(ROA)t+1 are -0.018***, -0.033*** and -0.061***, respectively, which 
indicates that the firms with a stand-alone risk committee are relatively more risk-averse 
compared to the firms with a joint audit and risk committee.  
Empirical evidence indicates that firm-specific characteristics and corporate 
governance settings influence corporate risk-taking (John et al., 2008; Nguyen, 2011). 
Columns 6–8 of Table 3 include the firm-specific and corporate governance-related variables 
and also the Inverse-Mill ratio (IMR) to eliminate self-selection bias.2 Consistent with our main 
results, in columns 3–5 of Table 3, we find that all the risk-taking measures ((R&D/TA)t+1, 
σ(MRET)t+1 and σ(ROA)t+1) have a significant negative association with RC even after 
                                                          
2 To avoid the multicollinearity concerns, we exclude both the highly correlated variables (BODSIZE and 
BODIND), one at a time to calculate the inverse mill ratio. The statistical significance of the results for equation 
1 remains unchanged. The details are explained in the latter part of this sub-section. 
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including the firm-specific and corporate governance-related variables. This indicates that the 
firms with a stand-alone risk committee have a relatively lower risk-taking propensity, 
consistent with the literature (e.g. Bargeron et al., 2010). Furthermore, we find a significant 
negative association between risk-taking measures and firm size (LOGSIZE), leverage (LEV) 
and profit margin (PM), which is also consistent with the literature (Subramaniam et al., 2009; 
Yatim, 2010). The adjusted-R2 ranges from 18.16% to 29.66% which indicates a strong 
predictability of the regression models. 
---------------------------- 
Table 4 about here 
---------------------------- 
To examine the impact of a stand-alone risk committee (RC) on the firm value 
(hypothesis 2), we estimate equation (2) and report the results in Table 4. As discussed earlier, 
we use two different proxies for firm value; TOBIN’SQ and ROA. The coefficient of a stand-
alone risk committee (RC) is 0.101 (t-stat = 7.54) and 0.034 (t-stat = 3.94) for TOBIN’SQ and 
ROA, respectively which shows that the firms with a stand-alone risk committee have relatively 
higher firm value. Among the control variables, the coefficients for firm size (LOGSIZE), and 
leverage (LEV) are positive and statistically significant at least at10% level. Firms with a larger 
board (BODSIZE) show a negative association with both the proxies of firm value (TOBIN’SQ 
and ROA) and the coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level. The adjusted R-
squares of the models range between 12.67% to 17.94%. To detect multicollinearity, we use 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) for all the independent variables. All the VIF values are well 
below the commonly used cut-off point of 10 which indicates no signs of multicollinearity.  
4.5 Additional tests 
a. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
We understand that the existence of a stand-alone risk committee might be a non-
random choice; therefore, our results might be driven by the systematic differences in firm 
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characteristics between the firms with a stand-alone risk committee and those with a joint audit 
and risk committee. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest matching the ‘treatment group’ to 
a ‘control group’ to test whether there is a statistically significant difference for the firm-
specific variables between the firms in each group. 
Using PSM, we estimate the difference between the corporate risk-taking of the firms 
with a stand-alone risk committee and the firms with a joint audit and risk committee. We use 
a stand-alone risk committee as a treatment group. The set of covariates for the matching 
estimates are the firm size (LOGSIZE), large auditor (BIG4), leverage (LEV), firm age 
(LOGAGE) and profit margin (PM). We use nearest neighbour techniques to perform the PSM 
model.  
---------------------------- 
Table 5 about here 
---------------------------- 
We rerun equations (1) and (2) to test our hypotheses 1 and 2 and report the results in 
Table 5. We find that all the measures of corporate risk-taking decline significantly for the 
firms that have a stand-alone risk committee compared with those that have a joint audit and 
risk committee. Furthermore, we find that the firms with a stand-alone risk committee have 
relatively higher firm value. All the results are statistically significant at least at the 5% level. 
Overall, our results in Table 5 based on PSM analysis are consistent with our main results and 
show a negative (positive) relationship between the existence of a separate risk committee and 
firm risk-taking propensity (firm value).  
b. Risk committee independence and risk-taking propensity 
A large body of corporate governance literature shows that a higher number of 
independent directors on the board enhances firm performance (e.g. Rosenstein and Wyatt, 
1990). Furthermore, a higher number of independent directors on the board is also positively 
associated with the existence of a risk committee (Yatim, 2010). Therefore, we rerun equation 
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1 to test the role of a stand-alone risk committee with a higher proportion of independent 
directors on the board and report the results in Table 6. The results indicate that the firms with 
a higher proportion of independent directors on the board in stand-alone risk committees are 
less likely to engage in risk-taking activities. For example, the association between independent 
risk committee (%RC_independence) and σ(R&D)t+1 is negative and statistically significant 
(coefficient=-0.003*, t-stat=-1.71), the association between independent risk committee and 
σ(MRET)t+1 is also negative and statistically significant (coefficient=-0.019**, t-stat=-2.04), 
and the association between independent risk committee and σ(ROA)t+1 is also negative and 
statistically significant (coefficient=-0.057**, t-stat=-2.74). The adjusted R-square ranges 
between 15.26% and 35.01%. 
---------------------------- 
Table 6 about here 
---------------------------- 
c. Impact of Missing R&D on our findings 
The accounting and finance literature often interprets the missing R&D values as firms 
with zero R&D activities; however, in a recent paper, Koh and Reeb (2015) find that firms with 
missing R&D values are unlike firms with zero R&D activities. Therefore, we reanalyse 
equation 1 after excluding the firm-year observation with zero R&D values. Results are 
tabulated in Table 6. We have a total of 348 firm-year observations with non-zero R&D values. 
The empirical evidence shows a significant negative association between RC 
(coefficient=-0.069**, t-stat=-2.11) and σ(R&D)t+1; whereas, a positive association is found 
between RC (coefficient=0.027* and 0.031, t-stat=1.79 and 2.29) and firm value. Overall, these 
results are consistent with our main findings.  
d. Impact of firm size on risk committee formation  
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Arguably, setting up a stand-alone risk committee requires the unique expertise of the 
directors; therefore, maintaining a separate risk committee might require additional costs. 
Consequently, the chances of setting up a stand-alone risk committee increase with firm size. 
Interestingly, Christensen, Kent, Routledge and Stewart (2015) show a significant shift by 
small and large companies during 2003 to comply with the Australian Securities Exchange 
Limited governance recommendations. We split the sample based on the median firm size 
(LOGSIZE) into small (below median) and big size (above median) firms and assign a value of 
1 to the big size firms, otherwise 0. Using equation 1, we find that that the big size firms with 
a stand-alone risk committee have less propensity to engage in risk-taking activities. For 
example, the coefficients for (R&D/TA), σ(MRET) and σ(ROA) are -0.008, -0.013 and -0.029, 
respectively, and all are statistically significant. The results are consistent with the notion of 
firm life cycle theory which indicates that big size firms are mostly at the mature stage of the 
firm life cycle and therefore have stable operating incomes and cash flows, which might 
discourage aggressive risk-taking. 
---------------------------- 
Table 7 about here 
---------------------------- 
e. Comparing firms with non-risk committee and stand-alone risk committees 
Finally, we understand that the firms without an operational risk committee, either a stand-
alone or joint audit and risk committee, also engage in risk-taking or risk-mitigating activities. 
Therefore, in this section, using a propensity score matching approach we compare the risk-
taking of firms with stand-alone risk committee versus firms with no risk committee (neither a 
stand-alone nor a joint audit and risk committee). We report the results in Table 7. We use a 
dichotomous variable (RC) to test the effect of stand-alone risk committees. We assign a value 
of 1 to the firms with a stand-alone risk committee and a value of 0 to the firms with no risk 
committee. We use each of the risk-taking proxies ((R&D/TA)t+1, σ(MRET)t+1 & σ(ROA)t+1) 
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separately as a dependent variable and RC as an independent variable. Columns 5-7 of Table 7 
show that RC has a consistently negative association with all the risk-taking proxies, consistent 
with our findings in Section 4.4.  
f. Risk taking and other corporate governance characteristics 
To examine whether our primary results of corporate risk-taking based on equation (1) 
are sensitive to different model specifications, we perform an additional sensitivity test that 
incorporates different corporate governance characteristics such as board size, board 
independence and audit quality. Extant corporate governance literature suggests a negative 
association between risk-taking and board size (e.g., Nakano and Nguyen, 2012). Jensen (1993) 
points out that when a board gets larger in size, higher coordination and communication costs 
make the board less likely to function effectively. In contrast, a smaller board is expected to 
act more consistently with the shareholders’ interest by encouraging value-increasing policies, 
which are possibly riskier than managers would have chosen otherwise (Lee and Lee, 2009; 
Yermack, 1996). Conventionally, a firm with a higher number of independent directors on 
board is less likely to be influenced by the CEO; thus, might be relatively less risk-averse 
relative to a firm with a lower number of independent directors on the board. Finally, a firm 
with high-risk project relative to a firm with low-risk project might prefer to be audited by non-
big4 audit firms to avoid highlighting audit risk. We measure BODSIZE as the natural 
logarithm of a total number of board members; BODIND as the proportion of independent 
directors on a board and BIG4 as a dichotomous variable assigned a value of 1 if the auditor is 
a BIG4 firm, otherwise 0. We add BODSIZE, BODIND and BIG4 in equation (1) and re-run 
the regression.  
We still find a negative and statistically significant association between RC (coefficient 
= -0.006, -0.015, -0.021; t-stat = -1.93, -1.74, -3.14) and all the risk-taking proxies 
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((R&D/TA)t+1, σ(MRET)t+1 & σ(ROA)t+1).
3 BODIND shows negative and statistically 
significant association (coefficient = -0.002, -0.004, -0.003; t-stat = -3.87, -1.89, -3.81) with all 
the risk-taking proxies. Findings of other control variables are consistent with our primary 
results. 
g. Do the risk committee attributes affect risk-taking and firm value? 
  As an additional robustness test, we consider other risk committee characteristics that 
might affect corporate risk-taking and firm value, such as financial expertise, tenure and 
busyness. Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2014) posit that ﬁnancial experts can identify risks 
that are beneﬁcial to shareholders and encourage management to take those risks. Following 
Güner, Malmendier and Tate (2008), we define financial expertise (FINEXP) as a continuous 
variable which is measured as the total number of directors with previous experience and 
expertise as CFO, CEO, or other financial executive positions or holding professional 
affiliation as CFA, FCA, FCMA, CPA and Ph.D., etc. Anecdotally, the risk perspective of the 
firm changes with the firm-specific experience (tenure) of a director as a director with longer 
tenure might be able to reduce corporate risk-taking. We use an average number of years of 
tenure of the risk committee members (RISKTEN). We also use the busyness of a risk 
committee since a busy committee might overlook the monitoring vigilance which might lead 
to selecting risky projects. We use an average number of directorial position held by the risk 
committee members (RISKBUSY). We estimate the following regression models: 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝜕0 + 𝜕1𝑅𝐶 + 𝜕2𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝜕3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉 + 𝜕4𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝜕5𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 +
𝜕6𝛥𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆 + 𝜕7𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝜕8𝑃𝑀 + 𝜕9𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑃 + 𝜕10𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑇𝐸𝑁 + 𝜕11𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌 +
𝜕12𝐼𝑀𝑅 + ∑𝜕𝑖𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + ∑𝜕𝑗𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + ɛ … … … … … (4) 
                                                          
3 We do not tabulate these results for the sake of brevity. 
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𝐹𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛾2𝐵𝑂𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝛾3𝐵𝐼𝐺4 + 𝛾4𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛾5𝐿𝐸𝑉 +
𝛾6𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉 + 𝛾7𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑃 + 𝛾8𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸 + 𝛾9𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝜕10𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑃 +
𝜕11𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑇𝐸𝑁 + 𝜕12𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌 + 𝛾13𝑅𝐶 + ∑𝛾𝑖𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + ∑𝛾𝑗𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + ɛ …  … (5) 
---------------------------- 
Table 8 about here 
---------------------------- 
Table 8 reports the result of equation (4) and (5). Columns 2 – 4 show the impact of a 
stand-alone risk committee on firm risk-taking (Equation 4). Consistent with our main results, 
we find that all the measure of risk-taking decline significantly for the firms with a stand-alone 
risk committee. Among the other variable of interest related to risk committee characteristics, 
RISKTEN shows a negative and statistical significant association (coefficient = -0.002, -0.002, 
-0.007; t-stat = -1.69, -3.71, -4.52) with all the risk-taking proxies [(R&D/TA)t+1, σ(MRET)t+1 
and σ(ROA)t+1]. Columns 5 and 6 report the impact of a stand-alone risk committee on firm 
value (Equation 5). We find a positive and statistically significant association between a stand-
alone risk committee (coefficient = 0.024, 0.009; t-stat = 2.38, 4.28) and both the measures of 
firm value (TOBIN’S Q and ROA). None of the variables representing the characteristics 
(financial expertise, tenure and busyness) of risk committee show any significant impact on 
firm value. In sum, all the robustness tests further confirm our main findings that existence of 
a stand-alone risk committee not only reduces the firm risk-taking but also enhances the firm 
value. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examined the impact of stand-alone risk committee on corporate risk-
taking and firm value. The primary objective of a stand-alone risk committee is to effectively 
manage the risk profile of the company and its members are experts in risk management. 
Therefore, we expected a relative decline in the risk-taking measure for the firms with stand-
alone risk committees as those firms are required to disclose additional risk-relevant 
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information. Furthermore, we suggested that the existence of a stand-alone risk committee 
would increase the value of the firm, as it is regarded as an indicator of good corporate 
governance in the effective management of the firm’s risk-related activities. 
We empirically examined our hypotheses using data for the years 2001-2013 from publicly 
trading Australian firms which had either a stand-alone risk committee or a joint audit and risk 
committee. We used three different measures to define corporate risk-taking, i.e., the level of 
research and development (R&D/TA) as an investment risk measure, the standard deviation of 
returns σ(MRET) as a market-based measure, and the standard deviation of return on assets 
σ(ROA) as an accounting measure. We document a significant negative relationship between 
corporate risk-taking and the existence of a stand-alone risk committee. Furthermore, we find 
that the firms with a stand-alone risk committee have a relatively higher firm values. Therefore, 
these results support our hypothesis that a stand-alone risk committee not only reduces firm 
corporate risk-taking but also enhances firm value. Our results are robust to controls for firm-
specific characteristics, corporate governance-related variables and use of a Propensity Score 
Matching technique.  
Our study contributes to the existing corporate governance literature in at least two ways. 
First, it presents the new evidence that firms that are subject to the same economic conditions 
and regulations differ in their corporate risk-taking based on their choice of the committee to 
manage firm risk. Second, our study is the first to empirically examine the impact of stand-
alone risk committee on corporate risk-taking and firm value. Our study is subject to 
limitations, and the primary limitation is that we keep our analysis limited to Australian firms 
because of the unavailability of data for other countries. Therefore, we hope that future research 
can further explore the relationship between corporate risk-taking and stand-alone risk 
committee in international settings.  
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Table 1 – Sample Distribution 
Details 
Firm 
Year 
Initial Sample 2001 – 2013 13,488 
Less: missing firms and years in matched DataStream and SIRCA  5,958 
Less: firm-year observations pertaining to financial institutes 811 
Less: No operational risk committees (neither a stand-alone nor a joint audit and risk committee). 4,818 
Final Sample 1,901 
 
Table 2 – Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
RC 0.127 0.333 0.000 0.000 1.000 
(R&D/TA) 0.016 0.071 0.000 0.000 1.074 
σ(MRET) 0.172 0.138 0.110 0.000 1.816 
σ(ROA) 0.137 0.330 0.050 0.000 5.818 
TOBIN’SQ 0.709 0.212 0.746 -2.391 1.115 
ROA 0.064 0.351 0.197 -0.301 1.024 
LOGSIZE 10.931 2.138 11.80 3.136 18.157 
MTBV 2.054 1.825 1.610 -3.920 8.900 
LEV 0.106 0.182 0.090 0.000 3.020 
CAPEXP 0.089 0.112 0.040 -0.520 0.567 
SALESCHANGE 0.255 0.776 0.080 -1.810 3.800 
LOGAGE 2.438 0.618 2.400 0.000 3.714 
PM -2.558 5.495 0.060 -15.400 15.399 
MILLS 2.842 0.749 2.740 0.000 5.798 
BODSIZE 5.991 2.228 7.000 1.000 17.000 
BODIND 4.353 2.172 5.000 0.000 15.000 
BIG4 0.595 0.491 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Note: RC is a dummy variable assigned as a value of 1 when the firm has a stand-alone risk committee,  otherwise 
0; (R&D/TA) indicates the total investment on research and development scaled by total assets; σ(MRET) is the 
standard deviation of monthly stock return; σ(MRET) indicates standard deviation of return on assets which is 
measure as the standard deviation of the income before tax and extraordinary items and scaled by total assets; 
Tobin’s Q is measured as a ratio of the firm’s market value to total assets; ROA is measured as the ratio of income 
before extraordinary items divided by total assets; LOGSIZE is firm size measured by the natural logarithm of 
total assets; MTBV is market value of firm scaled by total equity; LEV is firm leverage measured by total debt to 
total assets; CAPEXP is capital expenditure scaled by market value of assets; SALESCHANGE is sales growth 
measured by changes in sales scaled by total assets; LOGAGE is firm age measured by the natural logarithm of 
firm age since the firm was listed in ASX; PM is the profit margin measured by the net income before 
extraordinary items and tax scaled by total sales; BODSIZE is the size of board directorship measured by the 
natural logarithm of total board size; BODIND is the representation of independent directors in the board measure 
as a ratio of total number of independent directors to total board size; BIG4 is audit quality, assigned as a value of 
1 if the firm is audited by a big-4 auditor, otherwise 0. 
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Table 2 – Panel B: Mean-difference Statistics 
Variables 
RC = 0 
N = 1660 
RC = 1 
N = 241 
Mean Difference 
(t-statistic) 
(R&D/TA) 0.019 0.0002 0.018 (3.65)*** 
σ(MRET) 0.137 0.095 0.042 (6.34)*** 
σ(ROA) 0.099 0.032 0.067 (4.97)*** 
TOBIN’SQ 0.600 0.725 -0.125 (-8.70)*** 
ROA -0.061 0.015 -0.076 (-3.09)*** 
LOGSIZE 11.75 13.51 -1.75 (-13.14)*** 
MTBV 2.147 1.984 0.163 (1.69)* 
LEV 0.128 0.168 -0.04 (-3.72)*** 
CAPEXP 0.083 0.075 0.007 (1.06) 
SALESCHANGE 0.213 0.181 0.032 (0.72) 
LOGAGE 2.357 2.599 -0.242 (-5.38)*** 
PM -1.438 -0.647 -0.791 (-2.71)** 
BODSIZE 6.764 8.386 -1.622 (-10.67)*** 
BODIND 5.175 6.502 -1.327 (-8.94)*** 
BIG4 0.729 0.822 -0.093 (-3.79)*** 
Note: See Table 2, Panel A for variable definition.  
***, **, * indicates p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.10 
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Table 2 – Panel C: Correlation analysis 
Note: See Table 2, Panel A for variable definition. ***, **, * indicates p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.10 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
RC (1) 1.00                
(R&D/TA) (2)  -0.08*** 1.00               
σ(MRET) (3) -0.15*** 0.16*** 1.00              
σ(ROA) (4) -0.12*** 0.20*** 0.26*** 1.00             
TOBIN’SQ (5) 0.19*** 0.08*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 1.00            
ROA (6) 0.071*** 0.31*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.085*** 1.00           
BODSIZE (7) 0.24*** -0.07*** -0.26*** -0.16*** -0.18** 0.15*** 1.00          
BODIND (8) 0.20*** -0.07*** -0.27*** -0.16*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.90*** 1.00         
BIG4 (8) 0.07** -0.03 -0.25*** -0.16*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.30*** 0.34*** 1.00        
LOGSIZE (10) 0.29*** -0.24*** -0.43*** -0.36*** 0.15*** 0.40*** 0.66*** 0.64*** 0.44*** 1.00       
LEV (11) 0.10*** -0.15*** -0.22*** -0.22*** 0.06** 0.08*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.30*** 1.00      
MTBV (12) -0.03 0.17*** -0.09*** 0.14*** 0.03 0.07*** 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.10*** 0.01 1.00     
CAPEXP (13) -0.03 -0.13*** 0.12*** -0.01 0.10*** 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.08*** 1.00    
SALESCHANGE (14) -0.02 -0.01 0.07** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.08*** -0.06** -0.07*** -0.11*** -0.05** 0.00 0.14*** 0.14** 1.00   
LOGAGE (15) 0.12*** -0.02 -0.09*** -0.06** -0.07** -0.03 0.23*** 0.29*** 0.14*** 0.29*** 0.02 -0.07*** 0.03 -0.13*** 1.00  
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Table 3: Regression Analysis 
Note: See Table 2, Panel A for variable definition.  
***, **, * indicates p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.10 
  
Variables 
First 
Stage 
DEP = 
RC 
(R&D/TA)t+1 σ(MRET)t+1 σ(ROA)t+1 (R&D/TA)t+1 σ(MRET)t+1 σ(ROA)t+1 
Constant 
-5.217*** 
[-6.33] 
0.021*** 
[10.85] 
0.141*** 
[14.34] 
0.099*** 
[9.24] 
0.055*** 
[5.15] 
0.409*** 
[10.27] 
0.205** 
[2.74] 
BODSIZE 
0.193** 
[2.66] 
     
 
BODIND 
-0.234*** 
[-3.18] 
     
 
BIG4 
-0.316 
[-1.43] 
     
 
LOGSIZE 
0.307*** 
[4.79] 
   -0.005*** 
[-5.26] 
-0.018*** 
[-9.21] 
-0.015*** 
[-3.90] 
LEV 
1.239** 
[2.34] 
   -0.024** 
[-2.29] 
-0.042** 
[-2.77] 
-0.085** 
[-2.99] 
MTBV 
-0.041 
[-0.79] 
   0.005*** 
[6.29] 
-0.009*** 
[-8.18] 
0.013*** 
[6.12] 
CAPEXP 
 
   -0.082*** 
[-5.71] 
0.117*** 
[6.26] 
0.026 
[0.74] 
SALESCHANGE 
 
   0.001 
[-0.10] 
0.008** 
[2.74] 
0.016** 
[2.88] 
LOGAGE 
 
   0.004* 
[1.85] 
0.001 
[0.39] 
0.002 
[0.39] 
PM 
 
   -0.002*** 
[-4.69] 
-0.005*** 
[-8.76] 
-0.002** 
[-2.47] 
IMR 
 
   0.012** 
[2.08] 
-0.016** 
[-2.28] 
0.011 
[0.82] 
RC 
 
-0.018*** 
[-3.21] 
-0.033*** 
[-4.49] 
-0.061*** 
[-3.96] 
-0.014** 
[-2.34] 
-0.014** 
[-2.30] 
-0.023** 
[-2.01] 
INDUSTRY Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
YEAR Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
F-statistics/LR 
Chi2 
319.47*** 21.12 25.13*** 23.21 16.91*** 60.02*** 32.79*** 
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R-square 22.20 - - - - - - 
Adjusted R-
Square 
- 12.72 19.19 17.19 26.28 29.66 18.16 
Observations 1901 1901 1901 1901 1901 1901 1901 
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Table 4: Regression Analysis 
Note: See Table 2, Panel A for variable definition.  
***, **, * indicates p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.10  
Variables 
Dependent = 
FVAL=TOBIN’S Q 
Coefficients (t-statistics) 
Dependent = 
FVAL=ROA 
Coefficients (t-statistics) 
VIF 
Constant 
0.771*** 
[23.94] 
-0.881*** 
[14.82] 
 
BODSIZE 
-0.015** 
[-2.31] 
-0.037*** 
[-4.36] 
4.94 
BODIND 
0.009** 
[2.10] 
0.003 
[0.75] 
4.52 
BIG4 
0.067*** 
[6.18] 
-0.034 
[-0.98] 
1.28 
LOGSIZE 
0.009*** 
[4.72] 
0.101*** 
[12.21] 
1.05 
LEV 
0.179*** 
[6.01] 
0.124* 
[1.90] 
1.17 
MTBV 
-0.005** 
[-2.11] 
0.014** 
[2.45] 
1.24 
CAPEXP 
0.005** 
[2.19] 
-0.060 
[-0.75] 
1.61 
SALESCHANGE 
0.015** 
[2.22] 
0.292** 
[2.24] 
1.08 
LOGAGE 
0.001 
[0.12] 
-0.055*** 
[-4.32] 
1.03 
RC 
0.101*** 
[7.54] 
0.034*** 
[3.94] 
1.01 
INDUSTRY Controlled Controlled  
YEAR Controlled Controlled  
F-statistics/LR Chi2 23.53 38.18  
Probability 0.000 0.000  
Pseudo R-square - -  
Adjusted R-Square 
Observations 
12.67 
1901 
17.94 
1901 
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Table 5: Propensity Score Match Results 
Variables  (R&D/TA)t+1 σ(MRET)t+1 σ(ROA)t+1 Dep = FVAL 
TOBIN’S Q 
Dep = FVAL 
ROA 
       
Constant  0.014* 
[1.81] 
0.25*** 
[6.32] 
0.246*** 
[3.27] 
0.745*** 
[20.98] 
0.881*** 
[4.82] 
RC  -0.009*** 
[-3.58] 
-0.044*** 
[-3.91] 
-0.197*** 
[-5.22] 
0.091*** 
[7.37] 
0.032* 
[1.79] 
LOGSIZE  -0.001 
[-1.08] 
-0.008*** 
[-3.45] 
-0.014*** 
[-2.99] 
0.007** 
[2.42] 
0.101*** 
[16.61] 
LEV  -0.013** 
[-2.43] 
-0.048* 
[-1.86] 
-0.067* 
[-1.73] 
0.185*** 
[6.25] 
0.109** 
[2.45] 
MTBV  0.001** 
[2.38] 
-0.010*** 
[-3.86] 
0.019*** 
[3.69] 
-0.003 
[-1.51] 
0.012** 
[2.53] 
CAPEX  -0.014* 
[-1.74] 
0.253*** 
[6.55] 
-0.085 
[-1.23] 
0.163*** 
[3.90] 
-0.061* 
[-1.71] 
SALESCHANGE  0.001 
[0.98] 
-0.007 
[-1.10] 
0.026* 
[1.87] 
0.010 
[1.43] 
0.029** 
[2.24] 
LOGAGE  0.001 
[0.11] 
-0.004 
[-0.55] 
0.034** 
[2.62] 
-0.001 
[-0.12] 
-0.055*** 
[-4.41] 
PM  0.002 
[0.64] 
-0.007*** 
[-4.95] 
-0.013*** 
[-4.92] 
- - 
BODSIZE     -0.011** 
[-2.45] 
-0.037*** 
[-3.99] 
BODIND     0.009** 
[2.03] 
0.002 
[0.75] 
BIG4     -0.058*** 
[-5.46] 
-0.025 
[-.1.21] 
INDUSTRY  Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
YEAR   Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
       
F-statistics  5.20*** 8.55*** 6.17*** 24.73*** 38.08*** 
Adj R-squared  0.06 0.36 0.29 0.18 0.21 
N  482 482 482 482 482 
Note: See Table 2, Panel A for variable definition.  
***, **, * indicates p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.10  
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Table 6: Robustness test results (additional test b & c) 
% of RC independence Missing R&D 
Variables (R&D/TA)t+1 σ(MRET)t+1 σ(ROA)t+1 (R&D/TA)t+1 Dep. variable 
=TOBIN’SQ 
Dep. variable =ROA 
       
Constant 0.005*** 
[5.03] 
0.321*** 
[4.68] 
0.351*** 
[12.66] 
0.128*** 
[3.27] 
0.705*** 
[6.01] 
0.841*** 
[5.12] 
RC - - - -0.069** 
[-2.11] 
0.027* 
[1.79] 
0.031** 
[2.29] 
%RC_independence -0.003* 
[-1.71] 
-0.019** 
[-2.04] 
-0.057** 
[-2.74] 
- - - 
LOGSIZE -0.004*** 
[-5.85] 
-0.016*** 
[-6.87] 
-0.025*** 
[-11.36] 
-0.011*** 
[-3.39] 
0.017*** 
[3.98] 
0.028*** 
[3.85] 
LEV -0.023** 
[-2.27] 
-0.027** 
[-2.05] 
-0.124*** 
[-4.42] 
-0.101** 
[-2.05] 
0.095 
[1.37] 
0.109 
[1.21] 
MTBV 0.006*** 
[6.98] 
-0.009*** 
[-7.99] 
0.011*** 
[4.61] 
0.009** 
[2.87] 
0.003 
[0.75] 
0.002 
[0.97] 
CAPEX -0.104*** 
[-7.40] 
0.094*** 
[5.16] 
-0.076* 
[-1.91] 
-0.234*** 
[3.87] 
-0.051 
[-1.46] 
-0.037 
[-1.11] 
SALESCHANGE 0.001 
[0.09] 
0.009*** 
[3.30] 
0.027*** 
[4.38] 
0.029** 
[2.21] 
0.016* 
[1.86] 
0.015 
[1.36] 
LOGAGE 0.004** 
[2.04] 
0.003 
[0.85] 
0.015** 
[2.37] 
0.019** 
[2.03] 
0.032** 
[2.00] 
0.038** 
[2.17] 
PM -0.004*** 
[-5.03] 
-0.006*** 
[-12.52] 
-0.006*** 
[-6.25] 
-0.012*** 
[-8.21] 
- - 
BODSIZE - - - - -0.015* 
[-1.75] 
-0.021* 
[-1.69] 
BODIND - - - - 0.008* 
[1.81] 
0.003* 
[1.71] 
BIG4 - - - - -0.066*** 
[-3.99] 
-0.061*** 
[4.21] 
INDUSTRY Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
YEAR  Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
       
F-statistics 42.10*** 95.05*** 52.03*** 28.96*** 12.67*** 13.24*** 
Adj R-squared 13.85% 28.55% 17.83% 43.19% 13.47% 16.24% 
N 1901 1901 1901 348 348 348 
Note: See Table 2, Panel A for variable definition.  
***, **, * indicates p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.10  
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Table 7: Robustness test results (additional test d & e) 
 FIRMSIZE > Median=1, Otherwise 0 RC = 1 & NO_RC =0 
Variables (R&D/TA)t+1 σ(MRET)t+1 σ(ROA)t+1 (R&D/TA)t+1 σ(MRET)t+1 σ(ROA)t+1 
       
Constant 0.054*** 
[3.72] 
0.321*** 
[5.72] 
0.223*** 
[6.48] 
0.039*** 
[3.32] 
0.451*** 
[9.79] 
0.241*** 
[5.52] 
RC -0.008** 
[-1.99] 
-0.013* 
[-1.79] 
-0.029 
[-3.77] 
-0.007*** 
[-2.91] 
-0.018*** 
[-3.52] 
-0.031** 
[-2.10] 
LOGSIZE -0.004*** 
[-5.35] 
-0.014*** 
[-11.97] 
-0.023*** 
[-7.60] 
-0.002** 
[-2.51] 
-0.012*** 
[-8.95] 
-0.037*** 
[-13.71] 
LEV -0.027*** 
[-3.09] 
-0.027** 
[-2.16] 
-0.110*** 
[-5.29] 
-0.006* 
[-1.78] 
-0.017 
[-0.74] 
-0.025 
[-0.70] 
MTBV 0.005*** 
[6.92] 
-0.011*** 
[-9.65] 
0.009*** 
[5.40] 
0.005*** 
[5.95] 
-0.008*** 
[-7.62] 
0.030** 
[10.59] 
CAPEX -0.093*** 
[-7.40] 
0.111*** 
[6.45] 
-0.041 
[-1.38] 
-0.083*** 
[-9.40] 
-0.033** 
[-2.30] 
-0.131*** 
[-3.51] 
SALESCHANGE 0.002 
[0.70] 
0.009*** 
[3.40] 
0.025*** 
[5.44] 
-0.001 
[-0.81] 
0.009*** 
[4.29] 
0.027*** 
[4.62] 
LOGAGE 0.002 
[0.82] 
-0.001 
[-0.92] 
0.002 
[0.40] 
-0.005** 
[-2.83] 
0.008** 
[2.50] 
-0.011 
[-1.37] 
PM -0.003*** 
[-8.88] 
-0.005*** 
[-12.11] 
-0.006*** 
[-7.99] 
-0.002** 
[-2.07] 
-0.003*** 
[-10.45] 
-0.006*** 
[-6.53] 
       
INDUSTRY Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
YEAR  Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
       
F-statistics 13.68*** 35.35*** 17.63*** 10.88*** 65.78*** 27.54*** 
Adj R-squared 16.35% 36.29% 19.65% 10.82% 37.48% 13.65% 
N 1901 1901 1901 482 482 482 
Note: See Table 2, Panel A for variable definition. ***, **, * indicates p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.10  
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Table 8: Regression Analysis including the Risk Committee Characteristics 
Variables  Dep = RISK 
(R&D/TA)t+1 
Dep = RISK 
σ(MRET)t+1 
Dep = RISK 
σ(ROA)t+1 
Dep = FVAL 
TOBIN’S Q 
Dep = FVAL 
ROA 
       
Constant  0.057** 
[2.01] 
0.352*** 
[15.23] 
0.371*** 
[7.12] 
0.067** 
[6.25] 
0.317*** 
[6.98] 
RC  -0.005** 
[-2.29] 
-0.014** 
[-2.24] 
-0.030** 
[-2.17] 
0.024** 
[2.38] 
0.009*** 
[4.28] 
LOGSIZE  -0.006*** 
[-5.97] 
-0.016*** 
[-14.21] 
-0.274*** 
[-11.49] 
0.013* 
[1.96] 
0.079*** 
[13.82] 
LEV  -0.024** 
[-2.34] 
-0.021* 
[-1.69] 
-0.099*** 
[-3.48] 
-0.111* 
[-1.75] 
-0.075 
[-1.42] 
MTBV  0.006*** 
[6.52] 
-0.010*** 
[-9.03] 
0.012*** 
[5.25] 
-0.134*** 
[-5.25] 
0.016*** 
[3.68] 
CAPEX  -0.107*** 
[-7.29] 
0.099*** 
[5.53] 
-0.064 
[-1.55] 
-0.147* 
[-1.68] 
0.058 
[0.77] 
SALESCHANGE  -0.001 
[-0.12] 
0.008** 
[2.92] 
0.026*** 
[4.20] 
-0.033** 
[-2.38] 
0.011 
[0.98] 
LOGAGE  0.005* 
[1.93] 
0.003 
[0.96] 
0.018** 
[2.89] 
0.026* 
1.76] 
-0.389*** 
[-3.98] 
PM  -0.004*** 
[-9.74] 
-0.005*** 
[-12.34] 
-0.006*** 
[-5.67] 
- - 
BODSIZE     -0.008 
[-0.91] 
-0.032*** 
[-4.12] 
BODIND     0.007 
[0.81] 
0.002 
[0.29] 
BIG4     -0.038* 
[-1.73] 
-0.054** 
[-2.11] 
FINEXP  0.008* 
[1.79] 
-0.015 
[-1.22] 
-0.058** 
[-2.18] 
0.019 
[0.21] 
0.021 
[0.33] 
RISKTEN  -0.002* 
[-1.69] 
-0.002*** 
[-3.71] 
-0.007*** 
[-4.52] 
-0.034 
[-0.91] 
-0.009 
[1.61] 
RISKBUSY  0.001* 
[1.74] 
0.007 
[1.05] 
0.003* 
[1.94] 
0.003 
[0.75] 
0.015 
[0.87] 
INDUSTRY  Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
YEAR   Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
       
F-statistics  12.93*** 37.23*** 17.31*** 31.67*** 34.57*** 
Adj R-squared  0.17 0.36 0.23 0.37 0.42 
N  1901 1901 1901 1901 1901 
Note: See Table 2, Panel A for the description/definition of all the variables except FINEXP, RISKTEN 
and RISKBUSY. FINEXP is a continuous variable defined as the total number of director with previous 
experience & expertise as CFO, CEO, or other financial executive positions or holding professional 
affiliation as CFA, FCA, FCMA, CPA and Ph.D. etc., RISKTEN is defined as the average number of years 
engaged as risk committee members, and RISKBUSY is defined as the average number of outside directorial 
position held by the risk committee members. 
 
***, **, * indicates p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.10 
